PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, (...) addresses key systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

This volume continues the grouping of natural philosophers with cosmological interests and moral philosophers. With the natural philosophers, the contrast is between those who deny that true being can be found in the sensible world and those atomists who react to this monism in favour of the multiplicity of the sensible world. Since the exactly opposite conclusion has been recently maintained, Guthrie's assertion that Parmenides distinguished the concept of eternity from the concept of everlastingness is of particular interest. Of course, (...) Guthrie's acumen and erudition are so well established as to make his projected five volume history of Greek philosophy indispensable for any student—D. J. B. (shrink)

The Indiana Court of Appeals, in JKB, Sr. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co. ), held that the state's Blood Shield Act does not protect pharmaceutical companies that produce blood-derived products from product liability suits based on injuries attributable to tainted blood supplies. Blood shield statutes help to guarantee adequate blood supplies by limiting the liability of blood banks. This holding limits the defenses available to pharmaceutical companies sued under product liability theory.The defendant, Armour Pharmaceutical, produces and sells clotting factor agents, which (...) are derived through plasmapheresis. Plasmapheresis is a costly and complex donation process through which the plasma and red blood cells of a donor's blood are separated. After separation, the process returns the red blood cells to the donor but retains the plasma. (shrink)

Late in 1990, the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of Technology (lIT) received a grant of more than $200,000 from the National Science Foundation to try a campus-wide approach to integrating professional ethics into its technical curriculum.! Enough has now been accomplished to draw some tentative conclusions. I am the grant's principal investigator. In this paper, I shall describe what we at lIT did, what we learned, and what others, especially philosophers, can learn (...) from us. We set out to develop an approach that others could profitably adopt. I believe that we succeeded. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ad UnguemArmand J. D'Angour vos, oPompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite, quod nonmulta dies et multa litura coercuit atquepraesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.(Horace Ars Poetica 291–94) You, OSons of Pompilius, condemn that poem whichmany a day and many an erasure has not pruned andwhittled down and chastened tenfold to the nail."Censure a poem," Brink paraphrases, "which has not been reduced to right proportions and (when it has been reduced) has (...) not been tested to a nicety."1 Tested, that is, by its author, whose action Horace has been thought here to be likening to the way a sculptor examines a completed work for flaws. Translations of the final line commonly expand the phrase ad unguem to specify such a connotation, often taking praesectum to qualify unguem as in "to meet the test of the well–pared nail."2 But Brink has advanced convincing arguments against the supposition that praesectum qualifies unguem.3 Moreover, praesectum is positioned for emphasis and followed directly by deciens: the words must elaborate the process described by the foregoing coercuit.4Praesectum [End Page 411] thus picks up carmen, and no reference to the artisan's manicure should be supposed.5Ad unguem remains as a self–contained expression, to be understood in its own right.The image introduced in the following lines has been thought to present a deliberate point of contrast in the matter of the sculptor's fingernails:ingenium misera quia fortunatius artecredit et excludit sanos Helicone poetasDemocritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat,non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.(AP 295–98)Because Democritus believes that it's luckier to possess talentthan mere skill, and denies a place on Helicon to sane poets,a good number of artists make a point of not cutting their nailsor trimming their beards, but head for secret haunts and avoid baths.Despite the verbal echo, the change of tone and context at this point rules out any straightforward association of the unguem in line 294 with the ungues in line 297.6 Horace's humorous sketch of those "artistic types" who model their insalubrious habits on a superficial view of Democritean inspiration initiates a new section of the poem.7 It looks forward to a fuller consideration of the relative value of ars and ingenium, about which in due course Horace gives his opinion as follows:natura fieret laudabile carmen an artequaesitum est. ego nec studium sine divite venanec rude quid possit video ingenium; alterius sicaltera poscit opem res et coniurat amice.(AP 408–11) [End Page 412]The question is: Is good poetry due to nature or art?I myself fail to see what artistry can achieve without a rich vein of natural ability,or raw talent without application, to such a degree does the one attributedraw upon the other and make common cause with it.The only other instance of ad unguem in Horace is in Satires 1.5, where the phrase similarly appears tout court, conjoined to a past participle in a construction which parallels praesectum... ad unguem as construed above: interea Maecenas advenit atqueCocceius Capitoque simul Fonteius, ad unguemfactus homo, Antoni non ut magis alter amicus.(Sat. 1.5.31–33) Meanwhile Maecenas arrives andCocceius, and with them Fonteius Capito, a manof such consummate charm that Antony holds none dearer.Whether ad unguem here refers to physical or intellectual refinement (or both), the connotation "to perfection" is evident. Commentators ancient and modern have generally supposed that the metaphor is best explained by the image which Persius, writing around a century later, developed in his First Satire:quis populi sermo est? quis enim, nisi carmina mollinunc demum numero fluere, ut per leve severoseffundat iunctura ungues?(Sat. 1.63–65)"What's the word from the general public? "What else, but thatnow at last there are verses so fluent that no join jars criticalfingernails as they glide across the smooth surface.In commenting on AP 294, Ps.–Acro adduced this precisely evocative idea of "critical fingernails" for Horace's use of ad unguem:"ad unguem": tractum a... (shrink)

‘All the difficulties in the theory of forms arise from their separation.’ This recurrent criticism of Aristotle's is, of course, one of the principal obstacles in the way of any reconstruction of the Platonic metaphysic. To begin with, it is flatly denied by Plato himself in the use of such words as μέθεξις, παρoυσία and κoινωνία. It must also be rejected by the orthodox account of the Forms which takes them to be immanent, constitutive principles in the world of everyday (...) life, like a Law of Nature or the Concrete Universal of Hegel. Finally, modern philosophy has made it clear that this view of universals is right and necessary if thought and language are to exist, and it is therefore tempting to attribute it to Plato. (shrink)

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativism’s claim that the past must be re-described continuously from the perspective of the present to be the result of the following train of thought: 1) “all knowledge is conceptually mediated”; 2) “the conceptual framework through which knowledge of reality (...) is mediated changes with every new generation of historians”; therefore (narrativism’s claim) “the historical past changes with every new generation of historians”. The idea of an unchanging past, for the narrativist, requires denying premise 1 (all knowledge is conceptually mediated”) and therefore rests on a problematic commitment to the chimerical notion of the past as it is in-itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. We argue that the narrativist’s conclusion does not follow unless one adds a further premise, namely 3) “it is not possible to view reality through the categorial framework of historical agents”. If one asserts the possibility of grasping reality through the categorial framework of others, be they contemporary or past agents (as much philosophy of history written in an idealist key does), then one no longer has to accept the narrativist’s inference that since the past cannot be known in-itself or independently of conceptual mediation, then it cannot be known as it always was for the historical agents. Narrativism’s inference that the past cannot be known as it always was does not follow from premises 1 and 2 unless one smuggles in another problematic premise, premise 3. In this paper we defend the claim that the past can be known as it always was (not as it is in-itself) by invoking a different conception of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge, one which assumes the possibility of viewing reality through the categorial framework of others. This notion of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge is prevalent in the idealist tradition but, in the interest of brevity, we will defend this notion of mediacy by specific reference to the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS At the Origins of Modern Atheism. By MICHAEL J. BucKLEY, S.J. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. viii+ 445. Writing ostensibly a history of the philosophical origins of 18th century atheism in 17th century theism, Michael Buckley, S.J., has contributed a learned, subtle, and provocative hook whose length is significantly increased and whose focus is considerably enlarged by a running commentary about the metatheory (...) (Richard McKeon's philosophical semantics) that structures his reading of the chosen theists and atheists. Buckley provides the best summary of his own historical conclusion: "... theology generated apologetic philosophy and philosophy generated Universal Mechanics, and these in turn co-opted theology to become the foundations of theistic assertions... [But] when the contradictions between Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were further negated... god became a deus otiosus" [pp. 358-359]. This conclusion rests on a philosophical principle whose elements are taken from Plato's Seventh Epistle: " The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic negations are all set by the current theism " [p. 15]. In turn, this principle is justified by a cluster of meta-theses that are not easily summarized, although one stands above the rest: " Much more may he involved in such a process of ideas [from 17th century theism to 18th century atheism] than their· own internal necessity, hut internal necessity remains and governs inherently " [p. 334]. The latter meta-thesis asserts that there is a dialectic of ideas and it is from this point of view that Buckley reads the conceptual history of modern atheism. Dialectical necessity is a bugbear for many contemporary philosophers, hut Buckley argues, convincingly I think, that some kind of conceptual necessity links theism and atheism. Atheism is, essentially, the negation of a particular form of theism. In Hegelian terms, atheism is a determinate negation which draws all of its conceptual content from what it negates. Buckley, however, puts an even greater Hegelian spin on the same point. If the theism carries within itself a contradiction, it negates itself and, thereby, dialectically generates its contradiction-atheism [cf. p. 17]. " Modern atheism took not only its meaning hut its existence from the self-alienation of religion " [p. 359]. A theism that believes in the existence of an intelligent, personal God, Who creates and orders the universe, but that attempts a rational 144 BOOK REVIEWS 145 justification of this belief apart from the religious experience that alone can embody such a faith contains exactly the kind of inner contradiction that generates the negation of itself. Buckley focuses on the poignant contradiction of a Christian theology abandoning " the religious figure of Jesus as the principal evidence for the reality of God" [p. 41] in favor of some philosophy (whether that of Descartes, Malebranche, or Newton) which provides a different and allegedly more certain kind of evidence for God's existence. This theology, or more precisely the theistic philosophies it spawned, are the sources of modern atheism because, if Descartes and Newton are consistently combined, philosophy can do quite well without God. Laplace's famous reply to Napoleon, although it was not originally an atheistic slogan, captures what Diderot and d'Holbach thought: God is an unnecessary hypothesis in a truly universal mechanics which needs to presuppose only matter and motion. The historical story, of course, is more complicated than this skeleton dialectic can suggest. Buckley richly details the story but I shall rehearse only its opening chapter. Buckley begins with the Jesuit theologian, Leonard Lays (1554-1623), usually known under his Latin name, Lessius, whose De providentia numinis et anima immortalitate (1613) set the pattern for subsequent Catholic theology. Lessius, who was convinced that atheism by eliminating the eternal judge destroys morals and sound politics, revived Stoic arguments, numerous variations on a theme, which show that the universe is everywhere imprinted with a divine design. Lessius's intent, although he referred only to ancient philosophers, was not to replay the classical battle between the Stoics and the Epicureans but to combat the atheism, silent and disguised in contemporary Europe, that Lessius thought to be the inevitable outcome of the wars of religion and theological fights. Lessius, however, paid scant attention to his own insight... (shrink)

There is an inconsistency in the ways that doctors make clinical decisions regarding the treatment of babies born extremely prematurely. Many experts now recommend that clinical decisions about the treatment of such babies be individualized and consider many different factors. Nevertheless, many policies and practices throughout Europe and North America still appear to base decisions on gestational age alone or on gestational age as the primary factor that determines whether doctors recommend or even offer life-sustaining neonatal intensive care treatment. These (...) policies are well intentioned. They aim to guide doctors and parents to make decisions that are best for the baby. That is an ethically appropriate goal. But in relying so heavily on gestational age, such policies may actually do the babies a disservice by denying some babies treatment that might be beneficial and lead to intact survival. In this paper, we argue that such policies are unjust to premature babies and ought to be abolished. In their place, we propose individualized treatment decisions for premature babies. This would treat premature babies as we treat all other patients, with clinical decisions based on an individualized estimation of likelihood that treatment would be beneficial. (shrink)

Découverte près d'Alivéri en Eubée, cette importante inscription du milieu du IVe siècle av. J.-C. est demeurée longtemps inédite. Il s'agit d'une grande stèle amputée en haut et à gauche, où se lisent encore 35 lignes gravées stoichédon (à raison de 51 lettres par ligne après restitution). Sur la base du lieu de trouvaille, de la langue et du contenu, on peut rapporter à la même stèle le fragment IG XII 9, 190, en dépit du fait que ce petit morceau (...) — perdu depuis longtemps — n'a pas été présenté comme un texte stoichédon par son unique copiste. Ce rapprochement permet de restituer le frag ment en question (A) plus sûrement qu'on n'avait pu le faire jusqu'ici : c'est le début de la loi, avec l'énoncé des récompenses prévues pour le tyrannoctone, modulées en fonction de son statut politique et social. Le texte du nouveau morceau (B) se compose lui-même de deux sections distinguées par une asyndète significative. La première section (1. 1-17) comporte une série de clauses ayant pour objet la protection de la constitution démocratique contre toute tentative de mise en place d'un régime tyrannique, notamment par le biais d'une motion subversive : le contrevenant se verra non seulement privé de ses droits civiques (discussion sur la notion d'atimia à cette date) et de ses biens (confiscation par l'État — avec une dîme pour Artémis Amarysia, dont la prééminence dans le panthéon érétrien est ainsi confirmée), mais proscrit à perpétuité (interdiction d'inhumer ses restes dans l'Érétriade ou Érétrias gê; impunité et même récompense accordées à son meurtrier). Cette première section s'achève par une imprécation solennelle visant à décourager toute atteinte contre les dispositions de la loi elle-même (rôle intéressant des prêtres et des prêtresses — avec le mot rare, sinon même nouveau, hiéris pour hiéreia — lors des Dionysia et des Artémisia) ; entre les termes de cette imprécation et le libellé des grands serments « internationaux » (attestés à partir du IVe siècle précisément) il y a plus d'un point commun à relever. (shrink)

Publication de 25 inscriptions nouvelles de Kallipolis d'Étolie, provenant presque toutes des fouilles françaises et grecques de 1977-1979. Sur une exèdre semi-circulaire probablement surmontée d'une statue équestre, étaient gravés 18 décrets honorifiques abrégés datant du IIe siècle av. J.-C., les premiers décrets émanant d'une cité étolienne trouvés en Étolie. L'étude de ces décrets conduit à examiner la façon dont la datation éponyme était indiquée chez les Kallipolitains, tantôt par un ou plusieurs archontes, tantôt par le seul secrétaire des archontes. Ces (...) textes permettent d'autre part d'ébaucher le cercle géographique des relations d'une petite cité de Grèce centrale. Ils amènent enfin à examiner le rapport entre Kallipolitas et Kallieus, deux ethniques qui coexistent pendant près de 80 ans, et ne doivent pas correspondre à une seule et même communauté politique : Kallipolitas désigne les citoyens de la cité, tandis que Kallieus serait un ethnique régional, désignant tout ou partie des communautés environnantes, et peut-être lié à l'un des districts de la confédération étolienne. Parmi les autres textes ici publiés, remarquable est un ex-voto dédié à la Nuit divinisée et à Artémis. L'étude se clôt par la liste récapitulative des 18 inscriptions de Kallion-Kallipolis antérieurement connues, et par la prosopographie des Kalliéens et Kallipolitains, qui compte 194 entrées. (shrink)

In 1912 the Home University Library courageously offered to the amateur philosopher G. E. Moore’s Ethics and Bertrand Russell’s Problems of Philosophy. Now under the aegis of the Oxford University Press it offers a brief, selectively partisan retrospect over the half-century’s philosophy, which confines itself to these Cambridge reformers and their colleague, Wittgenstein and to their successors, the dominant Oxford school of analysis. Its donnish author issues a stern warning to the enthusiastic amateur, whether or not he be a professional (...) in another science anxious to plumb his own philosophical presuppositions, to allow English philosophers “to go their own way” without “public complaint or criticism”. English philosophers have just succeeded in achieving distinct professional status as “philosophers’ philosophers”, though they are still affected by nostalgia for “the old, kind days of amateurism”. He grants that “it seems to be true that the contemporary philosopher’s eye is characteristically cold and his pen, perhaps, apt to be employed as an instrument of deflation”. Nevertheless, without apprehension for the consequences of such narrow technique, he ironically underlines the ineffective state that “certain philosophers deplore the present aspect of their own subject, and that, more commonly, certain non-philosophers discuss philosophy with a plaintive and patronizing impertinence which they would not dream of displaying towards any other subject in which they were admittedly ill qualified”. This seems to deny the classic philosopher’s role of thinking for, and presenting his thoughts to the critical consideration of his fellow mortals. (shrink)

This slender volume presents a lucid English translation of a short but dense treatise, published in Paris in 1947 by the French ambassador to the Vatican, in which M. Maritain drew upon the capital of his metaphysical works to analyse the intellectual problems posed by fashionable Existentialism. While admitting that certain forgotten truths have been illuminated since Kierkegaard, he claims the existence of authentic Existentialism by prior right in the Thomist synthesis and exemplifies its wisdom in his acute evaluation of (...) some modern themes. Denying that this is a rejuvenation by verbal artifice of a staid tradition, he states his pure allegiance with blunt intransigence: “I should be ashamed to… trick out Thomas Aquinas in a costume fashionable to our day…. I am not a neo-Thomist. All in all, I would rather be a paleo-Thomist than a neo-Thomist. I am, or at least I hope I am, a Thomist”. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers explicitly claims the title of philosophy of ‘existence’, in the special sense of an illumination of the self-conscious being of a unique man facing the problem of transcending his individual, historic situation by real, personal choice even at the risk of teetering on the razor-edge of irrationality. With a wide range of medical and psychological knowledge and a deep philosophical interest he formulates the most systematic analysis of contemporary Existentialism, although paradoxically he denies the possibility of any universal (...) or objective science of being which is radically individual, contingent and ineffable in itself. Though individual human analysis has its limits, it is not a mere psychology but an active engagement of personal choice, which resists all attempt to absorb it in a complete rational scheme or science. The non-rational ‘encompasses’ every category of being, therefore, and philosophy must suffer light from the classic exceptions, particularly Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Of course classic intellectualism has always recognised that reality is never exhausted by any conceptual analysis, but Jaspers pushes this inadequacy almost into an opposition. Hence the methodological difficulty of exposition is multiplied in his case by a doctrinal impossibility of systematic science as opposed to developing self-consciousness. (shrink)

Une loi de Delphes du Ile siècle apr. J.-C. montre que la cité procéda à l'époque impériale à deux lotissements successifs de terres sur une partie de son territoire. On a supposé que la région lotie pouvait être le plateau de Desphina dans le massif du Kirphis. Cette déduction tirée du texte peut-elle être confirmée par l'examen du terrain? Le présent article tente d'apporter une réponse, qui intéresse à la fois l'histoire de Delphes et la méthode de la recherche sur (...) les cadastres antiques. Pour trouver les vestiges d'un parcellaire fossile on a recherché les trames orthogonales sur un orthophotoplan, puis tenté lors d'une prospection au sol d'identifier, voire de dater les lignes ainsi visibles. La méthode appliquée suivant des critères et des limites expressément définis ne permet pas, en toute rigueur, d'affirmer l'existence de vestiges matériels d'un lotissement antique de terres sur le plateau de Desphina. (shrink)

In 1931 Father D’Arcy, then also a don at Oxford, published the first comprehensive exposition and critical evaluation in England of John Henry Newman’s sole philosophical work, the Essay on Assent—if one excepts the contemporary set of censorious articles published by his pedantic confrère, Father Thomas Harper, in The Month and later edited for private circulation. Father D’Arcy’s philosophic humanism and lifelong interest in the apologetics of belief make him a particularly sympathetic commentator and his work has done much to (...) illuminate both the problem of belief and his illustrious predecessor. It is pleasant to welcome his urbane wisdom back to print in a new edition, whose Introduction concisely notes the current modest evaluation of certitude in science and whose revision includes a trenchant chapter on the shallowness of contemporary logical positivism and analysis. This latter has become more puzzled than sceptical about a certitude, which springs neither from direct observation nor from formal logic, and yet is commonly accepted in history and geography concerning matters of fact which are now either past or absent, and so apparently is beyond decisive rational verification. Nevertheless no one in practice reasonably denies the contingent existence of Mr. Krushchev or of China, even though he has never visited either. Religious belief is thus no more paradoxical than secular daily belief, whose certitude equally demands explanation and justification. (shrink)

This is a paperback edition of a 1953 anthology of select texts upon the existence and nature of God from some fifty representative thinkers, philosophical in a broad sense, from the pharaoh Ikhnaton and Lao-Tse through the classic theologians to the recent Whitehead, Berdyaev and Rahhakrishan. To their English edition by Mr Reese, Mr Hartshorne adds a metaphysical introduction, a critical comment upon each reading and an epilogue upon the logic of Panentheism, the metaphysical position from which he selects and (...) evaluates this survey of the philosophical gamut of reply to the central religious question. Panentheism claims to be the most balanced theology in the range from static monotheism to negative atheism and, accepting the ‘realist’ metaphysic of Whitehead particularly, denies timeless supernatural perfection to God, installing Him instead in the world-process in which He and men strive co-operatively for completion by self-realisation. In this perspective the pantheism of Spinoza is praised as a partial solution and the theism of Aquinas is castigated for its blindness to surrelativism: the concept that God is wholly simple is criticised because of the relations between God and the world, while Thomas’ appeal to knowledge by analogy is charged with inverting God as subject into the role of object. In contrast to the monopolar view of a supernatural God, the dipolar metaphysic claims two main consequences. (shrink)

Professor Martin of the University of Rhode Island in this trenchant lecture to the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University summarily diagnoses the present ill–health of philosophy ‘as an academic subject’ in the United States and Europe and insists as a first principle of proper therapy upon the sharp distinction of metaphysics and ideology, that form of anti–philosophy pervasive to–day. Metaphysics traditionally claims to possess rational and objective knowledge of reality as such and thus to be able to define itself and (...) other philosophic sciences. Ideologies commonly deny this absolute claim and their ambiguous ‘quest for reality’, relevant only for human practice, is classically defined by Karl Mannheim as ‘ “an instrument for dealing with life–situations” ’. For preserving health Professor Martin demands that a choice between them be made, in his pungent criticism of Mr. H. D. Aiken’s recent evaluation of metaphysical answers. (shrink)

Le but de cet article n'est pas de fournir une quelconque interprétation de la pensée de Deleuze ou de fournir des clés de lectures pour comprendre l'anti Oedipe. Plus modestement je tente de fournir un angle d'approche de cet ouvrage. Mon point de départ est le suivant : bien que Deleuze ait rédigé un ouvrage désormais classique sur Hume, ce dernier n'est que rarement cité parmi les sources de l'anti Oedipe. De là, j'ai esquissé quelques rapprochements afin de permettre d'éclairer (...) l'approche deleuzienne de la maladie mentale. (shrink)

Eleven Oxford dons and one guest-speaker from Melbourne in this candid series of talks, first delivered on the radio in 1955, seem to share a conscious disadvantage in respect of their subject, the irrepressible science of metaphysics—like a group of disconcerted bankers who return to trade with a one-time bankrupt, whose currency has irresistibly hardened again and for whom they now concert a limp welcome and a scratch set of trading rules. As Mr. Warnock wryly notes: “It would be impossible (...) to deny that respect or distaste for metaphysics is, though no doubt it should be an intellectual matter, in fact very largely a matter of temperament; and disagreements of this variety are notoriously liable to be heated and vehement, liable also to be long drawn out, inconclusive, and rather unprofitable”. After the eighteenth century bankruptcy proceedings instituted by David Hume and the subsequent doldrums of university philosophy, the empiricist suspicions of Victorian Britain led to the positivist hostility of the twentieth century towards that traditional, standard science, which Europe never substantially devalued. The current return in England is both a forced retreat from brash futility in the field of urgent values and of scientific postulates, and a cautious reconnaissance of old positions. The present exploratory discussion is not unlike an international truce in its tendency to bog down in procedural analysis and to substitute this new scholasticism for an engagement in the substantial business of metaphysics. Metametaphysics buries its head in sand of its own sophisticated creation; and the individual talks are not as distinct nor as simple as their titles might suggest. (shrink)

Un bloc découvert en 1980 dans une fouille du Service archéologique à Amphissa porte deux inscriptions hellénistiques. La première, datant sans doute du milieu du IIe siècle av. J.-C, est composée d'une lettre et d'un décret honorifique abrégé de Sparte en l'honneur d'un Amphisséen. L'intitulé du décret abrégé, tout en donnant une nouvelle attestation de la magistrature des nomographes à Sparte, est si elliptique qu'il autorise plusieurs interprétations. La seconde inscription est un décret honorifique abrégé d'Amphissa, datant vraisemblablement de la (...) fin du IIe siècle ou du début du Ier siècle av. J.-C, accordant la proxénie, le droit d'acquisition foncière, la sécurité et le droit de pacage à un dénommé Leukios Kaikilios Mnaséas qui est dépourvu de patronyme et d'ethnique. Ce doit être un Grec ayant reçu la citoyenneté romaine, ou peut-être plutôt l'affranchi d'un Romain. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour double objectif de retracer quelques éléments cartésiens dans la philosophie de Brentano et d'évaluer sa théorie de la conscience à la lumière des débats actuels dans la philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Les deux premières parties de cette étude évaluent la dette de Brentano à l'endroit de la philosophie de Descartes. Dans la première, je montre que Descartes est associé à plusieurs principes fondamentaux de la psychologie de Brentano, tandis que dans la deuxième, je propose une interprétation (...) de l'inexistence intentionnelle de Brentano à l'aide de la distinction cartésienne entre ens formale et ens objectivum. La troisième partie est un commentaire critique de l'évaluation par D. Rosenthal de la théorie de la conscience de Brentano dans sa Psychologie. Je m'intéresse plus particulièrement à la distinction que fait Rosenthal entre une conception aristotélicienne et une conception cartésienne de la conscience et me demande sous laquelle de ces deux catégories se range la théorie de Brentano. Dans la dernière partie, j'évalue la portée de quelques-unes des modifications importantes que Brentano fait subir à sa psychologie et à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses derniers travaux et j'avance l'hypothèse que ses positions sur la substance pensante et la conscience de soi le rapprochent encore davantage de Descartes. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de revoir ses textes principaux sur la conscience dans la perspective des deux thèses qu'il formule sur la conscience au tout début du deuxième chapitre du deuxième livre de sa Psychologie. Dans les trois premières sections de cette étude, je propose une analyse de ces deux thèses en accordant une attention particulière à la relation que Brentano établit entre la conscience et l'intentionnalité. J'examinerai ensuite sa théorie des objets primaires et des objets secondaires par (...) laquelle il articule ses deux thèses sur la conscience. Dans la cinquième et la sixième section, j'examine deux problèmes que soulève la théorie de la conscience de Brentano, à savoir le problème de la régression et celui de la complexité qu'il cherche à résoudre à l'aide de son principe de l'unité de la conscience. Dans la dernière partie, je me pencherai sur quelques écrits de Brentano publiés à titre posthume dans lesquels il fait intervenir la notion d'agent psychique (psychich Tätige) dans ses propos sur la conscience et j'essayerai de montrer que la prise en compte de l'agent dans ces écrits vise à solutionner certains problèmes laissés en suspens dans sa Psychologie. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de montrer l'influence que la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte a exercée sur la pensée du jeune Brentano durant la période de Würzburg (1866-1874). J'examine d'abord quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont amené Brentano à s'intéresser à la philosophie de Comte et je résume, dans un deuxième temps, les grandes lignes de l'article de Brentano sur Comte dont la version française est reproduite dans ce numéro. Dans la troisième partie de cette étude, je commente brièvement quelques (...) passages de la Psychologie d'un point de vue empirique où Brentano discute de thèmes comtiens. Je conclue cette étude par quelques remarques sur les traces laissées par le positivisme de Comte dans l'œuvre de Brentano. (shrink)

Étude du relief Gonze 2120 (IG II², 11546), d'époque impériale : cette pierre errante, dont l'onomastique (Τείχιππος = Τήχιππος, nom exclusivement érétrien sous cette forme) trahit une origine eubéenne, doit être en fait identifiée à une stèle vue en 1850 par Rangabé près de K. Vathia-Amarynthos (IG, XII 9, 168). On examine alors cinq autres stèles eubéen- nes publiées à tort comme attiques : il s'agit de IG, IP, 12983 ; 12652 ; 12795 ; 12816 et 12888, identifiables respectivement à (...) IG, XII 9, 132; 1092; 1100, 1165 et 1103. Observations sur divers anthroponymes : f Τησώ (Κτήσων!), Χαον, Θεόδαισις, Τήθτη (sic), Φίλαγρος, Άσκληπιόδωρος et l'expansion du culte d'Asklépios dès la fin du Ve s. avant J.-C. Voyageurs en Eubée au XIXe s. : l'architecte Schaubert, le consul von Hahn, Rangabé et Pittakis. La contribution de Koumanoudis au dictionnaire de Pape-Benseler. Remarques générales sur le corpus des épitaphes attiques. Stèles de Kythnos au Musée d'Athènes. (shrink)

Résumé J’ai toujours été intrigué par le fonctionnement du texte de théâtre. Ça ne m’a d’ailleurs jamais tellement plu. Les trois mises en scènes décrites ici, ont toutes été réalisées en utilisant des machines et des objets mais selon des modalités très différentes. Théâtres sans acteurs, elle relataient toutes trois des rapports amoureux tragiques avec plus ou moins de distance.

Providing an introduction to law in modern society, D. J. Galligan considers how legal theory, and particularly H. L. A Hart's The Concept of Law, has developed the idea of law as a highly developed social system, which has a distinctive character and structure, and which shapes and influences people's behaviour.The concept of law as a distinct social phenomenon is examined through reference to, and analysis of, the work of prominent legal and social theorists, in particular M. Weber, E. Durkheim, (...) and N. Luhmann. Galligan's approach is guided by two main ideas: that the law is a social formation with its own character and features, and that at the same time it interacts with, and is affected by, other aspects of society. In analysing these two ideas, Galligan develops a general framework for law and society within which he considers various aspects including: the nature of social rules and the concept of law as a system of rules; whether law has particular social functions and how legal orders run in parallel; the place of coercion; the characteristic form of modern law and the social conditions that support it; implementation and compliance; and what happens when laws are used to change society.Law in Modern Society encourages legal scholars to consider the law as an expression of social relations, examining the connections and tensions between the positive law of modern society and the spontaneous relations they often try to direct or change. (shrink)

The consent and community engagement process for research with Indigenous communities is rarely evaluated. Research protocols are not always collaborative, inclusive or culturally respectful. If participants do not trust or understand the research, selection bias may occur in recruitment, affecting study results potentially denying participants the opportunity to provide more knowledge and greater understanding about their community. Poorly informed consent can also harm the individual participant and the community as a whole. Invited by local Aboriginal community leaders of the Fitzroy (...) Valley, the Kimberley, Western Australia, The Picture Talk project explores the consent process for research. Focus groups of Aboriginal community members were conducted to establish preferences for methods of seeking individual consent. Transcripts were analysed through NVivo10 Qualitative software using grounded theory with inductive and deductive coding. Themes were synthesised with quotes highlighted. Focus groups with Aboriginal community members were facilitated by a Community Navigator as a cultural guide and interpreter and a researcher. Participants were recruited from all main language groups of the Fitzroy Valley – Gooniyandi, Walmajarri, Wangkatjungka, Bunuba and Nikinya. Participants were aged ≥18 years, with 5 female groups and one male group. Themes identified include: Reputation and trust is essential; The Community Navigator is key; Pictures give the words meaning – milli milli versus Pictures; Achieving consensus in circles; Signing for consent; and Research is needed in the Valley. Aboriginal communities of the Fitzroy Valley recommend that researchers collaborate with local leaders, develop trust and foster a good reputation in the community prior to research. Local Aboriginal researchers should be employed to provide cultural guidance throughout the research process and interpret local languages especially for elders. Pictures are preferred to written text to explain research information and most prefer to sign for consent. The Fitzroy Valley welcomes research when collaborative and for the benefit of the community. Future research could include exploring how to support young people, promote health screening and improve understanding of medical knowledge. (shrink)

Article en hommage à Jacques English dans lequel je propose une réflexion générale sur le thème des objets intentionnels en examinant un aspect de la solution proposée par Husserl dans son manuscrit de 1894 sur les objets intentionnels qui concerne le statut ontologique des objets de pensée et leur temporalité. J’aborde cette question par le biais de l’individuation des contenus intentionnels et leur temporalité dans les manuscrits de Bernau publiés dans le volume XXXIII des Husserliana . Je m’intéresse en particulier (...) au sens que prend le principium individuationis dans la cinquième partie de ces manuscrits de Husserl qui s'intitule «De la phénoménologie de l’individuation : la temporalité des objets d’expérience, des objets imaginaires et des objets idéaux». (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo et Raimo Tuomela (...) traitant de problèmes généraux de la philosophie de l'esprit et de l'action. Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Phénoménologie, ontologie et philosophie de l'esprit, nous avons regroupé, autour d'un texte de Nicolas Kaufmann, quatre études qui traitent diversement de la contribution de la phénoménologie classique, principalement de la phénoménologie de Husserl, à des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine dans les domaines de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la théorie de l'action et de l'ontologie formelle. La troisième partie de l'ouvrage, Causalité et naturalisme, réunit trois contributions qui portent sur des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine. Daniel Laurier se penche sur la question de savoir si le normativisme sémantique est compatible avec le naturalisme sémantique, alors qu'André Leclerc et Wilson Mendonça s'intéressent à la notion de causalité mentale et examinent différents arguments qui contestent le bien-fondé de cette notion. La dernière partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Rationalité et décision réunit trois contributions logico philosophiques de Storrs McCall, Mathieu Marion et Michel Paquette qui traitent de la rationalité des agents lors de leurs prises de décision et délibérations. (shrink)

Publication ou republication de dix actes d'affranchissement provenant de Physkeis, cité de Locride occidentale, et datant du IIe siècle av. J.-C., ainsi que d'une énigmatique dédicace que P. Jamot copia en 1888 entre Malandrino-Physkeis et Lidoriki. À côté de deux actes très fragmentaires et de la révision d'IG IX l2, 671, l'article donne le texte complété d'IG IX l2, 676 et cinq autres actes inédits, qui avaient été gravés sur deux orthostates du sanctuaire d'Athéna Ilias. Parmi ces affranchissements, les uns (...) sous forme de vente à la déesse, les autres sous forme de consécration, trois présentent des formulations singulières. Ces textes attestent les éponymes et un nom de mois, Agreios, de la cité locrienne des Dymanes, et ils font d'autre part connaître trois nouveaux agonothètes locriens, dont on donne à cette occasion la liste récapitulative. (shrink)

On nous a habitué, dans les études husserliennes, à traiter de la ques tion du rapport de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques à Brentano dans la perspective de la critique que Husserl adresse à la théorie immanen tiste de l’intentionnalité dans cet ouvrage*. Mais cette perspective laisse dans l’ombre un enjeu fondamental de la question qui sous-tend les discussions de Husserl dans la § 15 de la cinquième Recherche et dans l’Appendice au deuxième volume de l’ouvrage, à savoir ce que (...) j’appellerai par commodité la thèse du caractère coextensif de la conscience, de l’inten tionnalité et de la pensée. Je voudrais montrer que la critique que Husserl adresse à cette thèse s’appuie sur la distinction introduite dans ses premiers travaux à Halle entre les actes et les contenus sensibles ou contenus pri maires, plus précisément entre deux classes au sein de l’expérience sensible, la première correspondant aux phénomènes psychiques de Brentano, l’autre, qui n’est pas intention nelle, correspond à ce qu’il est maintenant convenu d’appeler la conscience ou l’expérience phénoménale. Pour ce faire, j’exami nerai la critique de la théorie de la perception de Brentano (uniquement celle de sa Psychologie de 1874) dans la première édition des Recherches logiques ainsi que dans un traité sur la perception publié récemment sous le titre de « Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung von 1898 » qui était vraisemblablement destiné à la deuxième série des Re cherches logiques. (shrink)

Je m'intéresse ici à la question de savoir ce qu’il y a de descriptif dans la phénoménologie et ce qu’il y a de phénoménologique dans l’usage de la notion de description dans la philosophie contemporaine. Pour répondre à cette question, je retrace, dans un premier temps, les origines de la notion de psychologie descriptive au dix-neuvième siècle et j’identifie ensuite quelques-uns des traits caractéristiques du concept husserlien de description; dans un deuxième temps, j’examinerai quelques aspects du concept de description tel (...) qu’on l’utilise dans la tradition analytique depuis le dernier Wittgenstein en portant une attention particulière à la question de savoir s’il recoupe ou non le concept husserlien; dans la troisième partie, j’esquisse rapidement le problème de la conscience dans la perspective d’un fossé de l’explication et j’examine brièvement la question de savoir si et à quelle condition la phénoménologie descriptive peut y apporter sa contribution. (shrink)

Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande , de Kevin Mulligan, ras - semble huit études dont l’ambition affichée est à la fois historique et philo - sophique. Leur intérêt n’est pas seulement de révéler, avec lucidité et profondeur, des accointances jusqu’ici quasiment inexplorées avec Brentano et ses héritiers proches ou lointains. La question est aussi de savoir quelles positions sont préférables là où elles divergent. Je voudrais d’abord discuter un détail historique qui me fait problème, sans être tout à fait sûr (...) que le désaccord soit plus qu’une question de formulation. Cette première discus - sion en amènera une seconde dont l’enjeu, philosophique cette fois, est celui- ci : sur un point précis où Mulligan accorde sa préférence à Wittgenstein, à savoir sur l’ a priori , une certaine conception brentanienne me paraît pour ma part préférable. Comme le point me semble philosophiquement central, j’espère apporter par là un peu plus qu’une remarque de détail. (shrink)

Commentaires sur l'interprétation de la phénoménologie chez N. Kaufmann qui préconise une approche que j'ai appelée la lecture frégéenne de la phénoménologie. Je commente brièvement quelques-uns des problèmes liés à cette approche. J'examinerai ensuite le postulat de base de cette approche de la phénoménologie qui consiste à voir dans la théorie husserlienne de l'intentionnalité la tentative d'articuler le concept de directionalité emprunté de Brentano sur la théorie de la signification de Frege. Cette question fait l'objet de la deuxième et de (...) la troisième section où j'examine la thèse suivant laquelle la théorie de la signification de Frege aurait rendu possible à la fois de résoudre les difficultés inhérentes à la conception immanentiste de l'intentionnalité de Brentano, et d'élaborer une théorie relationnelle de l'intentionnalité. Dans la quatrième section, je pose la question de savoir comment et à quelles conditions cette théorie de l'intentionnalité pourrait nous être utile devant les problèmes auxquels nous faisons face actuellement dans la philosophie de l'esprit. Dans la dernière section, j'énumère quelques traits caractéristiques de l'analyse intentionnelle et évalue sa pertinence dans le domaine des phénomènes mentaux et de l'action. Je conclue avec quelques remarques générales sur les difficultés liées à cette approche de la phénoménologie. (shrink)

Une question très discutée parmi les commentateurs des Recherches philosophiques de Wittgenstein est celle de savoir s'il souscrit à une conception « communautaire » ou, plutôt, à une conception « individualiste » des notions de signification et de ce que c'est que « suivre une règle ». J'examine cette question en la plaçant dans le contexte d'une interprétation de l'argument qu'il avance contre la possibilité d'un langage privé. J'essaierai de montrer que, malgré les objections soulevées par les tenants de l'interprétation (...) « individualiste », on peut donner une lecture plausible de son argument dans la cadre d'une conception « communautaire » des règles.Whether Wittgenstein subscribes to a " community " or an " individualist " view of meaning and of rule following is a much debated question among students of the Philosophical Investigations. I will discuss this question by relating it to the issue concerning the correct interpretation of his well-known argument against the possibility of a private language. I will argue that, despite objections which have been raised by proponents of the " individualist " interpretation, a plausible reading of Wittgenstein's argument can be given within a " community " view of rule following. (shrink)

L?esprit est-il intégralement passif, comme l?empirisme a parfois tendu à le croire, ou bien y a-t-il un sens à lui prêter un caractère de « sponta­néité » ? Et si nous attribuons à l?esprit un caractère de spontanéité ou de libre activité, alors avons-nous le moyen de le faire sur une base empirique ? ou bien cette spontanéité n?est-elle qu?un hypothétique principe extra-phénoménal ? Mon ambition ici est seulement de poser une certaine variante de ce problème et de dresser un (...) rapide panorama de quelques solutions qui y ont été apportées. J?ai récemment tenté d?apporter des arguments en faveur d?un dua­lisme de la passivité et de l?activité en théorie de la perception 1 . Mon intention était de promouvoir une conception relativement conservatrice de l?expérience, défendue notamment par la plupart des brentaniens. J?ai essayé de montrer par des exemples qu?une description adéquate et complète de la perception sensible ne peut faire l?économie de la notion d?activité attention­nelle. Plus précisément, la passivité sensorielle, même configurée, est insuffi­sante pour rendre compte de l? objectivation perceptuelle. Dans cette optique, j?ai entrepris une défense des théories de l?attention contre certaines critiques issues en particulier de l?école gestaltiste de Berlin et de Gurwitsch. Mon argument initial était, pour l?essentiel, que la notion gestaltiste de configuration passive rend. (shrink)

In recent years "British" Idealism has been subject to sweeping re-evaluation and rehabilitation. The essays collected here by Will Sweet compare Bernard Bosanquet's ideas and arguments with those of Idealists and non-Idealists alike, and establish that Bosanquet was far more clear-headed and insightful than denunciations of the "Idealist school" by Moore, Russell, C. D. Broad, Harold Prichard, and A. J. Ayer suggest. Sweet observes in his introduction that Bosanquet has long remained in the shadows of T. H. Green and F. (...) H. Bradley, that Bosanquet was a prolific writer who shaped philosophical debates across the English-speaking world for decades, and that estimations of his social theory and political philosophy, and to a lesser extent his metaphysics, have diverted attention from his contributions to logic and aesthetics.Essays by Sandra M. den Otter, Peter Nicholson, and Kevin Sullivan deal directly with Bosanquet's social philosophy. Bosanquet was engaged from the 1880s in work with the Charity Organisation Society, an association that set the tone of late Victorian and Edwardian debates over British poverty. He and his wife served on the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws , against whose majority statement—cautioning against such direct assistance to the poor as. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Dans cette étude, je propose d’appliquer au cas du souvenir épisodique le débat qui oppose le simulationnisme à l’approche théorie-théorique. Après avoir critiqué l’approche théorie-théorique, je défends une solution simulationniste du problème du rapport entre la phénoménologie du souvenir épisodique et la conscience de soi qui s’y manifeste. Je soutiens que la subjectivité s’introduit dans le contenu même du souvenir épisodique, mais qu’elle le fait non pas en tant qu’élément du contenu mais sous la forme du caractère perspectif qu’elle (...) donne à celui-ci et qui permet la simulation de l’expérience passée. À l’appui de cette thèse, je procède à une analyse sémantique inspirée par J. Perry des penséesde sequi confère au sujet du souvenir épisodique une inhérence non-représentationnelle au contenu mnésique. (shrink)

Sont ici publiés trois décrets de la cité de Kyténion, ainsi qu'une série d'épitaphes de la Doride de Grèce Centrale. Les uns, inscrits sur une exèdre d'un type courant, peuvent, malgré leur forme abrégée, être datés de ca 150 av. J.-C, grâce à des recoupements prosographiques en Locride Ozole et en Doride. L'intérêt principal des autres est de livrer les premiers témoignages d'écriture de cette région. L'ensemble de ces textes donne de nouvelles attestations de noms rares et celles de quelques (...) noms nouveaux. La prosopographie des Doriens de la Métropole compte 243 numéros. (shrink)

Les pages qui suivent sont consacrées à un certain problème qui est au fondement de l’éthique de Franz Brentano. Je tâcherai de clarifier et de problématiser l’idée brentanienne d’une analogie entre logique et éthique, entre correction logique et justice éthique, entre l’existant et le bien. Après en avoir dégager la signification générale, j’en indiquerai les conséquences les plus importantes sur l’éthique brentanienne dans son ensemble. Une première conséquence, que je commenterai en détail, est l’« objectivisme » éthique de Brentano, dont (...) je montrerai qu’il n’est pas forcément synonyme de réalisme. Ensuite, j’expliquerai en quels termes Brentano s’efforce de transposer analogiquement à l’éthique sa théorie de la vérité-correspondance, y compris sa reformulation en termes d’évidence. Enfin, je donnerai quelques brèves indications sur l’influence marquée qu’a eue l’éthique brentanienne sur Husserl, en me limitant à la question de l’analogie logico-éthique. (shrink)